Are There Good Institutions in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry? by Luki, Nammei Bayuasi
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.9, 2016 
 
23 
Are There Good Institutions in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry? 
 
Nammei Bayuasi Luki 
Ghana Technology University College, P.O Box MC 3262, Takoradi 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am heartily thankful to Prof. Graeme Martin, whose encouragement, guidance and support from the initial to 
the final level enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject. Lastly, I offer my regards and blessings to 
all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of this project 
 
List of abbreviations 
AGOC Aramco Gulf Operations Company 
BoG Bank of Ghana 
CBN Central Bank of Nigeria 
CPI Corruption Perception Index 
GNIPC Gross National Income Per Capita 
DI Democracy Index 
DPR Department of Petroleum Resources 
EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
FA Federal Account 
FIRS Federal Inland Revenue Service 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FI  Formal Institutions 
GHF Ghana Heritage Fund 
GRA Ghana Revenue Authority 
GSF Ghana Stabilization Fund 
GPF-G Government Pension Fund-Global 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IAC Investment Advisory Committee 
II Informal Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IOC International Oil Company 
HC Human Capital 
HDI Human Development Index 
MFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
NOC National Oil Company 
NCS Nigeria Customs Service 
NNA Nigerian National Assembly 
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
OGSRIC Oil and Gas Sector Reform Implementation Committee 
PF Petroleum Funds 
PIB Petroleum Industry Bill 
PRMA Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
PSA/C Production Sharing Agreement/Contract 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
RIAC Revenue Investment Advisory Committee 
SC Social Capital 
SCPMA Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs 
UN                         United Nations 
UNDP                              United Nations Development Programme 
WGI  Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
Abstract 
Managing petroleum resource revenue and turning it into a sustainable treasure is challenging, and the role of 
institutional factors in this regard cannot be over emphasized. Oil producing countries in Africa have not 
achieved better living standards. In 2001, out of 32 oil exporting countries worldwide, 6 of the 9 countries with 
the lowest human development indicators are in sub-Saharan Africa. Following this situation it becomes 
necessary for a country like Ghana with relative political stability and who recently discovered oil takes 
institutional measures to escape from issues of oil curse, hence the need for such a study a worthwhile venture. 
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To do this, the study employs the use of secondary information from articles, journals, and other relevant 
academic literature to do desktop analysis. Deductive approach to qualitative analysis is used as this helps to 
devise a framework to organize and direct the data analysis. The study reveals that with the exception of 
Norway, who has strong productive institutions, the institutions of the rest of the three sample countries (Ghana, 
Nigeria and Saudi Arabia) appear to be weak. Also, the study indicates the importance and the criteria for 
measuring good and effective institutions, and how petroleum wealth affects institutions and reciprocally how 
institutions affect sustainable development and management of petroleum resources.  
A framework developed in figure 3 shows that participation, human and social capitals are important 
determinants of institutional factors and thus necessary for sustainable development and management of 
petroleum resources. The framework indicates two different outcomes when hydrocarbons are discovered in a 
country; either sustainably managed or oil cursed depending on the kind of institutions that precede the oil 
discovery. The study also shows that Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia respective oil and gas industry institutions 
are characterized by strong destructive and weak productive institutions. How and what the oil revenue is 
invested in is the most crucial decision in terms of sustainable development and management. Good governance 
is the most appropriate option now for Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. To do this the study recommends that 
the concept of ‘Good Enough Governance’ by Grindle should be employed. The idea is that these countries 
should pursue improvements in their governance in ways that are feasible and possible to their specific context 
rather than trying to replicate the so called best functioning models from a country like Norway. It is also 
recommended that Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia invest in human and social capital since they are vital 
ingredients for every functioning institution. Key words: good institutions, oil and gas 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 Introduction 
"I wish your people had discovered water". 
               King Idris of Libya, when he was told that a US consortium had discovered oil 
Most often than not, mankind believes that discovering a treasure is a fortune and a promise of 
happiness. Notwithstanding, Ross (2012) and Ascher et al (1990) take a contrary view that countries that are 
endowed with natural resources tend to grow at a slow pace compared with countries without or with few natural 
resources. Katz et al (2004) indicate that in spite of enormous petroleum resources in Nigeria; its Gross 
Domestic Product is still the same forty years ago. Between 1965 and 1998, the growth rate of some oil rich 
countries such as Venezuela and Iran was 1% per annum and Kuwait and Iraq 3% within the same period (Ross, 
2012). These disheartening outcomes could be attributed to the effects of the petroleum policies on petroleum 
wealth and human endeavor. This wealth usually tends out to be a blessing or a curse (Humphreys et al, 2007). 
Humphreys (2007) and colleagues add that the resource wealth sometimes even tends to relegate the other 
sectors of the economy to the background, a sign of the infamous 'Dutch Disease'. The disease even becomes 
more severe when the temporary resource wealth industry finally displaces the manufacturing sector 
(Humphreys 2007). This study seeks to explore the role of institutional factors in the sustainable development 
and management of petroleum resources and how these institutions are applied in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and 
Saudi Arabia oil and gas industries in their quest to astutely manage their petroleum resource revenues. Finally, 
the lessons Ghana can derive from these countries in order to ensure prudent petroleum resource revenue 
management. 
The recent discovery of oil in commercial quantities off the Cape Three Points in 2007 took Ghana to 
join the club of oil producing countries (Oteng 2007). This evoked the urgent need for institutional policies to be 
put in place to ensure that the oil revenue inures development. A comprehensive look into the institutional 
practices and policy issues of petroleum resource revenue management in Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia 
will be explored relating to government contracts, investment portfolios, environmental issues and revenue 
management. This research focuses more on the latter to explain how this may influence development outcomes 
through the management of oil revenues.  
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
Any person who has dreamt of winning the lottery or finding a buried treasure assumes that a large cash windfall 
is going to make him rich or better off. However, for many developing countries, finding a valuable natural 
resource like oil can have some peculiar and even sometimes political consequences that tend out to be a curse 
(Ross, 2012, Karl, 1997). Katz et al (2004) indicate that, in 2001, African oil producing countries together 
produced an average of 3.8 million barrels of oil per day, representing about 5 per cent of world oil production. 
Their average production was projected to increase to 5 million barrels per day by 2006. Oil exports in Africa 
amounted to more than US$25 billion per year between 1997 and 2001 and were estimated to increase to US$30 
billion between 2002 and 2006. Yet in terms of infrastructural development, administrative capacity, human 
resources and living standards, these resource endowed countries (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, 
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Republic of Congo and Uganda in the case of Africa) grew less rapidly than resource poor countries during the 
last quarter of the twentieth century (Katz et al, 2004, Karl, 1997). In general, oil producing countries in Africa 
have not achieved better living standards. In 2001, out of 32 oil exporting countries worldwide, 6 of the 9 
countries with the lowest human development indicators are in sub-Saharan Africa (Bainomugisha et al, 2006). 
Following this situation it becomes necessary for a country like Ghana with relative political stability and who 
recently discovered oil takes institutional measures to escape from issues of oil curse, hence the need for such a 
study a worthwhile venture. 
 
1.2. Objectives of the Study 
The Aim 
To explore the role institutional factors play in the sustainable development and management of petroleum 
resource revenue in Ghana 
The Specific Objectives 
1. To identify institutions responsible for the management of petroleum resource revenue in Ghana, 
Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia.  
2. To assess the suitability of these institutions based on the institutional theory. 
3. To determine the lessons Ghana can derive from Nigeria, Norway, and Saudi Arabia. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
The study is a desk based analysis based on the use of secondary information from literature. Deductive 
approach to qualitative analysis is used as this helped me to devise a framework to organize and direct my data 
analysis (Yin, 2003). Secondary information according to Saunders et al (2009) is most appropriate for 
comparative research in situations where data is readily available. This provides for rich and robust data and 
enhances validity. The information will qualitatively be discussed alongside the objectives of the study. 
Qualitative analysis provides for in-depth knowledge and gives a true view of situations. Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000) indicate that qualitative methods emphasize on the socially constructed nature of reality, the close 
relationship between the researcher and what is being studied, and the situational limitations that shape the 
inquiry. The secondary data are likely to be of high quality than primary data (Stewart and Kamins as cited by 
Saunders et al, 2009).The quantitative aspect covered the use of quantitative variables in the institutional 
indicators for comparison. In general, the theoretical framework applied in this research covers different subject 
areas within extractive industry resource revenue management, finance, environment and development. In this 
direction, the research focuses on the relevant literature on institutional framework, the concepts, importance and 
criteria for good institutions. Features of good institutions drawn from the institutional theory and institutional 
frameworks were used in drawing graphical comparisons between the selected countries. 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
The focus of this research is the role institutions play in the sustainable development and management of 
petroleum resource revenue in Ghana with lessons from Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. The natural gas is 
not distinguished as a separate industry throughout the research, and most of the analysis on oil is considered to 
hold for gas too.  
 
1.5. Definition of Concepts and terms 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to make known some terminologies. 
Oil/Resource curse: the economic, social and political disorders in a natural resource rich or endowed country 
constitute the oil/resource curse. In fact, the correct terminology should have been mineral curse and more 
specifically petroleum curse since the malady is not caused by other kinds of natural resources such as forests, 
fertile land, and fresh water resources.  
Petroleum resources and petroleum revenues: In this study, it is the petroleum revenue that accrues to the 
government after the investor has taken out its cost of production and the profit oil shared between the investor 
and the government. The two terms; petroleum resource and revenue is being used interchangeably.  
Institutions: are the rules of the game that influence human behavior in society (North, 1990). In this research, 
they are the rules, regulations and policies that influence how petroleum resource revenues are managed or used 
in a particular country. 
The sustainable management / development of petroleum resource revenue: refers to the use of petroleum 
resource revenue in such a way that it meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generation to meet their own needs. Sustainable development or management of petroleum 
resources is made possible through the establishment of petroleum funds, human capital and investment in 
durable public infrastructure that will benefit and advance society for generations yet to come. 
Human Capital: the stock of knowledge, competencies, skills, experiences and training acquired by individuals 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.9, 2016 
 
26 
Social Capital: in this research concerns the relationship that exists between the media, civil society, the general 
public and the government. 
Dutch Disease: Negative tendencies resulting from huge increases in a country's income stream. The Dutch 
disease is basically as a result of oil and gas resource discovery. It can also be caused by an increase in foreign 
currency such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Foreign Aid or an incessant rise in natural resource prices in a 
particular economy. 
 
1.6 Contribution of the study 
This study contributes to academic literature on the oil curse and gives a practical understanding of the 
petroleum revenue management in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. It also provides an understanding 
of the role human and social capitals as well as participation play through institutions in the sustainable 
development and management of petroleum resource revenue. Also, the study is the first of its kind thus the 
institutional analysis of sustainable petroleum resource revenue development and management in Ghana. The 
study also provides a general sketch of the petroleum revenue management institutions in Ghana, Nigeria, 
Norway and Saudi Arabia and the lessons Ghana and mechanisms Ghana has put in place to escape the oil curse 
and ensure sustainable development. 
Fiscal regimes vary from country to country and are usually codified in production sharing 
agreements/contracts (PSAs or PSCs) (Duval et al, 2010). Under these agreements, the state represented by the 
National Oil Company (NOC) maintains ownership of the oil and appoints a contractor or investor through a 
competitive bidding process to help the government develop the oil. Payment for the investor is share of 
production of the oil thereof. The government however, will not recompense the investor for exploration costs if 
the oil deposits are not worth developing (Katz, 2004) 
The PSA/C normally specifies the percentage of the total production of the resource that would be 
retained by the investor to recoup its costs i.e. Cost oil and the remaining oil thus profit oil are divided between 
the investor and the state according to a formula predetermined in the PSA/C even before the exploration, 
production and development of the oil (Duval et al, 2010). The government in principle receives the physical oil 
from the investor, but usually agrees on joint marketing with the investor (Katz, 2004). Besides, the profit oil 
shared between the investor and the state, the state also levies the investor oil income tax and various bonuses 
such as a signature bonus (Katz, 2004) 
How the institutions in the state manage its share of the resource revenue is what constitutes the central 
theme of this research. The astute management of the oil revenue depends on a number of intervening variables 
and the role of institutional factors cannot be discounted. If the institutions in charge manage the revenue well 
(prudent spending), then it becomes a blessing, if they do mismanage (through corruption), they country will find 
itself drowning in the devil's excrement (Ross, 2012). 
 
1.7 The outline of the Study 
The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study with the problem statement, 
objectives of the study, the methodology, definition of concepts and terms and the contributions of the study to 
knowledge. Chapter two reviews academic literature on the role of institutional factors in the sustainable 
management of petroleum resources, thus it is dedicated to understanding the concept of institutions, the 
relationship between petroleum wealth and institutions and how institutions in turn affect the sustainable 
management of petroleum wealth. The last part of the literature review highlights the importance of institutions 
and how to measure good and effective institutions. A framework is finally developed to help understand this 
relationship which is of importance to Ghana as an emerging oil country. The framework distinguishes two 
different outcomes when a country discovers hydrocarbons; the country is either oil cursed or the oil is 
sustainably developed and managed.    
The chapter three deals with the findings of the research which is important to understanding the 
institutional landscape of the sample countries thus Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. It also identifies the 
various institutions responsible for petroleum resource revenue management in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and 
Saudi Arabia. Chapter four discusses and analyses the findings and the lessons Ghana can derive from Nigeria, 
Norway and Saudi Arabia. The final chapter concludes with some critical comments. 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 Review of literature on the role of institutional factors in the sustainable development and 
management of petroleum resources 
“The importance of institutions has emerged as a key aspect of the natural resource curse debate. In the context 
of a viable social contract, based on widely agreed formal and informal rules for the allocation of resources and 
the settlement of grievances, institutional arrangements can be sufficient to restrain opportunistic behavior and 
the violent expression of grievance”. 
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The World Bank, 2003 
The discovery of natural resources such as petroleum resources may be like a blessing (Ross, 2012). 
However, just like winning the lottery, there are many challenges associated with managing such influx of 
revenues (Humphreys et al, 2007).If the petroleum resource revenue is not managed well, then the country falls 
prey to the resource curse syndrome, but if it does manage it astutely, it becomes a blessing (Katz et al, 2004). 
The chapter seeks to explore the literature on the ‘oil curse’ i.e. The problems of managing petroleum resources 
by reviewing academic literature on the topic and relating those challenges to concepts like institutions, human 
and social capital and how such issues can affect the sustainable development and management of petroleum 
resource revenue. The chapter is divided into seven sections: introduction, the concept of institutions, oil 
resource revenue and institutional quality, and how institutions affect petroleum resource revenue management. 
The last four sections include; importance of institutions, good and effective institutions, and finally indicators 
for good institutions. 
A nation can be regarded as being oil cursed if it exploits her petroleum resources and the resulting 
revenues do not bring about economic development or growth (Drysdale, 2007). A surface review of relevant 
literature on the topic presents the perception that the oil curse is unavoidable when a nation discovers 
hydrocarbons in commercial quantities (Bainomugisha, 2006). However, some countries like the US, Norway, 
Canada have managed to escape the oil curse (Rosser, 2007). 
The challenges facing the sustainable management of petroleum resources are legion and are, in this 
literature categorized into institutional and economic. The chapter will start by giving a brief discussion of the 
economic challenges of the oil boom. Even though the main focus is on the institutional aspects of the oil curse, 
the institutional and economic issues about the oil curse are intertwined and often difficult to decouple (World 
Bank, 2005). I will briefly explain the infamous ‘Dutch Disease’ and thereafter, a framework relationship 
between petroleum resource revenue management and institutions will begin to evolve. The last part is 
committed to examining the institutional challenges of petroleum wealth. 
Bainomugisha (2006) and colleagues provide evidence indicating that abundance of petroleum 
resources often leads to slower economic growth through what is called the Dutch Disease. The proposition of 
the ‘Dutch Disease’ phenomenon is that countries endowed with natural resources tend to be slower at 
innovation and creativity relative to resource poor countries. This is attributed to resource rich over reliance on 
the ‘manner’ sent from heaven which tends to weaken other sectors of the economy such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, industry, service that keep the economy vibrant and healthy (Ascher, 1999).  Because of large 
inflows of oil revenues, oil rich nations tend to be quick at buying even basic goods and services instead of 
producing them (Bainomugisha et al, 2006). This gives rise to an economy that is difficult to sustain when 
petroleum resources are completely exhausted. A clear example is Gabon whose over reliance on the oil 
destroyed its agricultural sector. With oil resources almost exhausted, the country now has to feed her citizenry 
from imported food with less income from the oil sector (Bainomugisha et al, 2006). 
The institutional literature on the sustainable management of petroleum resources is relatively new and 
still at the developing stage. Here, there is a reciprocal relationship between how petroleum wealth affects 
institutions and how institutions in turn also affect the sustainable management of petroleum resource revenue. 
The three main institutional challenges according to Drysdale (2007) are: corruption, oil related conflicts and 
mismanagement of petroleum resource revenues. The assertion that institutions affect the management of 
petroleum resource revenue is important to understanding how oil resource revenue can be managed to bring 
about sustainable development. The fact that there is corruption, conflict and oil resource revenue 
mismanagement in a country may not necessarily be as a result of the presence of petroleum resources. 
Important to institutional qualities are human and social capital development (Drysdale, 2007). Thus 
human and social capitals are seen as important determinants of institutional quality. Lack of human capital in a 
country can have a direct impact on its institutional quality and consequently affects how well institutions 
function. For instance, revenue mismanagement may be attributed to the inability of the institutions to manage 
finance due to lack of or inadequate human capital (Katz et al, 2004). It stands to reason therefore that with 
strong and robust institutions in place, manned by the right human capital; a country can manage its petroleum 
resource revenue astutely leading to sustainable development or will mismanage its oil wealth as a result of poor 
institutions coupled with low human capital development. 
The debate about how oil wealth impacts on a country is dated back as early as the 14th century 
(Stevens, 2003). Auty’s (2001) research shows that there is a correlation between resource wealth and economic 
growth rate. However, Ross (2001) was quick to add that economic growth is just one of the measures of 
sustainable management or development. Nankani (1979) adds that social development and income inequality 
are not also peculiar to resource endowed countries. The review works by World Bank 2005, Davis et al 2005, 
Manning 2004, and Stevens 2003 among others on the oil curse indicate that there is a negative correlation 
between natural resources (oil) and economic growth. However, Hannesson (1998) counters this saying that 
countries like Norway, the US, Canada have managed their oil wealth well. This, Drysdale (2007) concludes that 
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the oil curse is an economic dilemma.  
While current efforts geared to ensure sustainable management of petroleum resources emphasize the 
role and responsibilities of various characters, relatively little attention is being paid to the potential contribution 
of institutional factors in the management of petroleum resources (Bryan and Hofmann, 2007). Yet the 
fundamental functions of institutions in the oil and gas industry are crucial to mitigating the various problems 
that are associated with the sustainable management of petroleum resources (Brunnchweiler, 2007). Davis et al 
(2010) state that instead of attributing poor economic performance to such issues as; lack of natural resources, 
climate change, the genetic makeup of the people, it is now conventional to search for institutions as the panacea 
to economic development issues. Institutions according to Davis et al (2010) are not products of the natural 
environment such as minerals, farmlands, fresh water or temperate climate neither they are made up of physical 
structures like factories, roads or dams. 
The roots of institutional theory are traced back to the years of formative social sciences enlisting and 
incorporating the creative works of scholars such as Marx and Weber, Cooley and Mead, Velen and Commons 
among others (Bill et al, 1981). Contemporary Institutional theory is employed to analyze systems ranging from 
micro interpersonal relationship to macro global frameworks of institutional analysis (Scott, 2004). Scott (2001) 
further adds that institutional theory of late has reached a promising stage and that institutions are consisted of 
cultural cognitive, normative and regulative elements coupled with associated activities and resources that help 
bring stability and more meaning to social life. Although institutional scholars have diverse opinions on the 
emphasis they put on these elements and the different levels of analysis at which they undertake their work, all 
recognized the fact that social behavior and associated resources are anchored in rule systems and cultural 
schema (Zucker, 1987).   
 
2.1 Institutions 
Institutional theory attends to the multifaceted and more robust aspects of social structure. It considers the 
processes and procedures by which structures, norms, rules, schemas become established as authoritative control 
mechanisms for social behavior(Scott, 2004).Institutional theory determines how institutions are created, 
adopted, adapted and diffused over time and space and how these institutions come to be of use or of no use 
(Scott, 2004). In fact, there is no one accepted definition of institution as there are many interpretations of it as 
there are institutions (WIDER Jubilee Conference, 2005).A generic definition of institutions is institutions are 
the rules of the game that influence human behavior in society (North, 1990). This is further explained as a set of 
rules that regulate how human beings interact in a particular society by helping them fully or partially develop 
expectations of what other actors will or will not do (Rodrick, 2007). Veblen (1909) defines institutions as 
“settled habits of thought common to the generality of men”. Glaeser et al (2004) see institutions as the property 
rights and the fundamental structures of the government. Glaeser (2004) and colleagues draw a distinction 
between institutions and policies. They see a policy to concern such things as government expenditure, exchange 
rates, interest rates, and wage and price control mechanisms among others. If institutions are the rules of the 
game, then some of these policies listed above qualify as institutions (Davis, 2010).  
The endless discourse about the definition of the term institution and organization led to some scholars 
reject the definitions of institution and organization; instead, they focused on the practical applicability of the 
two terminologies (Hodgson, 2006). The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably (Davis, 2010). Davis 
(2010) says there is no clear dichotomy between institutions and organizations. North (1994) objects this 
conflation between institution and organization and asserts that if institutions are the rules of the game, then 
organizations and entrepreneurs could be seen as the players of the game. Dovers (2005) objects Davis (2010) 
assertion and draws a distinction between the two. Organizations are manifestations of institutions such as 
associations, agencies among others. He further adds that an organization can sometimes become influential and 
persistent such that it can be classed as an institution, but generally, organizations are easy to dissolve or change, 
on the other hand, institutions are lasting. 
Institutions present incentives, opportunities as well as limitations for organizations in society. The term 
institutions could also be defined as the social, economic, legal and political structures of a society. It is also 
necessary to distinguish between formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions (FI) according to 
(Hodgson, 2006) are those endorsed by the state and that any other institutions fall within the category of 
informal institutions (II).But Knight (1992) sees an II as rules that regulate or structure how people interact in a 
particular society such as forming or standing in  a queue or corruption. Since IIs are part of cultural and social 
institutions, then it stands to reason that individual expectations are embedded in these social and cultural 
institutions. Whether formal or informal institutions, they cannot go beyond a particular society of transcend 
national frontiers (Knight, 1992).Dovers (2005) definition of a formal institution is similar to that of Hodgson.  
North (1990) indicates that most of the time, organizations are classed as formal institutions. Examples of formal 
institutions include political institutions, government departments, trade unions, NOCs, IOCs, legislature or 
judiciary among others (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Dale et al (2001) explain that institutions apply not only 
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to government departments, but also to routine patterns of behavior between the individual (micro level) and 
other groups in society (meso level) and the state (macro level) at large whether formal or informal or directly or 
indirectly involved in the petroleum resource revenue use and management. 
If institutions are important in determining economic development and we want to know why 
differences in economic development across time and space despite the availability of natural resources, then it is 
important to first understand why and how institutions vary from country to country (Hodgson, 2006). 
Institutions are neither static nor neutral (Leftwich, 2006). As indicated earlier, institutions allocate incentives 
(advantages and opportunities) and disincentives (disadvantages) in different ways and of course there will be 
winners and loser in the course of establishing or changing them. It is commonly agreed that institutions can be 
formal or informal depending on the context, thus the definition of institution will depend on the purpose of the 
analysis (Leftwich, 2006).Durkheim (1938) summarizes everything about institutions saying that social science 
is the science of institutions. For the purposes of this research, the term is used to refer to formal institutions thus 
organizations, norms, rules and formal social systems because they are easy to change relative to informal 
institutions. 
 
2.2 Petroleum wealth and institutions 
Recent literature on the oil curse has shown how petroleum resource revenue can affect the quality of institutions 
in a country. North (1990) indicates that the discovery of petroleum resources can either strengthen or weaken 
the institutional capacity of that country. Institutional quality differs from country to country and from being 
weak, strong, and unpredictable with features of resilience and persistence (North, 1990). He further says that 
strong institutions reduce unpredictability and result in compliance and conformity which are necessary 
ingredients of good institutions designed to achieve sustainable development. When institutions such as 
corruption are strong in a nation, it becomes difficult if not impossible to lift the oil curse (Katz et al, 2004).  
A situation where institutions in a country negatively affect other institutions in their quest to ensure 
sustainable development, such institutions are called Development Impeding Institutions (Grafton and Rowlands, 
1996). Grafton and Rowland illustrate this to show the relationship between the quality of development and 
Development Impeding Institutions.  
Figure 1: Development Impeding Institutions 
 
Source: adopted from Grafton and Rowland, 1996 
In the figure according to Grafton et al (1996), the lines A and B represent different development paths. 
Both lines show a move in the direction of exclusive development where the masses in the society will benefit 
from the oil resource revenue. To achieve this, they say Development Impeding Institutions must be weakened. 
Institutions, whether destructive or productive according to Matthews (1986) can be strengthened or 
weaken depending on the time frame. Matthew further indicates that there is some kind of inertia associated with 
institutional change because institutions take a longer time to evolve. Institutional change according to Drysdale 
(2007) occurs at a glacier space. At the center of creating, changing and sustaining institutions are human beings. 
People who benefit from an institution are likely to act in a way that will help sustain that institution whereas 
losers are likely to work towards changing the institution to their favor (Matthews, 1986). Institutions that wield 
and sustain the interest of the masses with power have a greater chance of being strong while institutions that 
serve the minority selfish bureaucrats and politicians are likely to be destructive and informal (Drysdale, 2007). 
Not every strong institution will positively impact on sustainable development. 
Institutional literature on the oil curse elucidates that some oil endowed countries have weaker 
institutions compare with countries without petroleum resources (Mehlum et al, 2002, Sala-I-Martin and 
Subramania, 2003). An analysis of the resource curse and  how it affects formal and informal institutions and 
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sustainable development is illustrated by Sala-I-Martin and Subramania, 2003, Ross, 2003, Drysdale, 2007 and 
Woodcock et al, 2001) in figure 2. 
Figure 2: The impact of petroleum resource revenue on institutions 
 
This framework develops as the literature unfolds. The institutional literature on the oil curse can be 
grouped into; rent seeking and corruption, oil related conflict and resource revenue mismanagement (Drysdale, 
2007). These issues are not absolute in the sense that it is not every oil endowed country that faces these 
challenges in the management of their petroleum wealth.  
Rent seeking is when individuals or groups look for means that will benefit them by manipulating 
institutions to their advantage contrary to established and legal of creating wealth. This has the tendency to affect 
those mostly the majority in society who would have benefitted from the normal and legal means of creating 
wealth (Krueger, 1994). Though there exist a difference between rent seeking and corruption, both have the 
potential of negatively affecting institutional quality and sustainable development (Bhagwati, 1982). Corruption 
is not legal while rent seeking is legitimate and can be encouraged by the state. 
Literature on the relationship between rent seeking and corruption establishes that resource endowed 
countries such as Nigeria are susceptible to rent seeking and corruption compared with resource poor countries 
like Burkina Faso (Drysdale, 2007). Natural resources such as oil present an incentive for corruption and rent 
seeking behavior that in the long run establishes a milieu that supports strong but destructive institutions such as 
corruption to wipe out productive and good institutions such as transparency and accountability (Robbins, 2000). 
Frequent fighting, for example, over oil rents may lead to civil unrest and political instability and reduction in 
the quality of democratic decision making and consequently, fall in democratic institutions (Drysdale, 2007). As 
corruption and rent seeking persist, the gap between the have (bourgeois) and the have nots (proletariat) widens 
making it very difficult to maintain democratic institutions. 
Petroleum resources are mismanaged mostly because the institutions that are entrusted with the 
responsibility to manage such resource revenues lack the necessary capacity or are weak to perform such 
functions (Drysdale, 2007). This problem is attributable to bad institutions and low human capital development. 
Human capital is said to be crucial to the sustainable management of petroleum resources. Gylfason (2001) and 
Manning (2004) assert that low human development capital in a country can have negative tendencies on the 
petroleum resource revenue management. 
 
2.3 How institutions affect petroleum resource revenue management 
The previous section discusses how petroleum wealth may affect economic growth, institutions and sustainable 
development. The fact that a country experiences high corruption, civil unrest/oil related conflicts and revenue 
mismanagement does not mean that country is resource or oil cursed because bad institutions that retard 
economic development or growth may be as a result of other factors. Sala-i-Martin and Subramania (2003) 
suggest that proper management of petroleum resources can build or strengthen the capacity of productive 
institutions. World Bank (2003) also suggests that a country can take advantage of abundance of petroleum 
resources to encourage productive or good institutional development.  
As Sala-i-Martin et al (2003) indicate that the quality of institutions that precede the discovery of 
petroleum resources are important in determining how these resources are managed and their impact on the 
economy of a nation. The literature so far has shown that the role of human capital to institutional quality cannot 
be over emphasized. Social capital has been yet another determinant of institutional quality. 
If the quality of an institution is critical to the sustainable management of petroleum resources, then it 
does make sense to understand what makes these institutions good and strong. According to Putnam (1988), 
social capital is an embodiment of social organization that facilitates coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit (Fukuyama, 2001 as cited by Drysdale, 2007). Since the focus of this research is not about social capital, 
its precise definition may not be necessary rather its integral role in understanding strong institutions is what 
matters. 
Social capital has a close link to understanding institutions whether formal or informal institutions 
(Knowles, 2005). Knowles (2005) further explores this connection and indicates that social capital is related to 
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the concept of what North (1990) explains as an informal institution. Social capital is also seen as the 
investments that encourage participation and cooperation in both formal and informal institutional settings and 
can be regarded as a precondition for establishing good and strong institutions for managing oil resource revenue 
(Drysdale, 2007). Trust and healthy relationships are crucial to strengthening of institutions and how individuals 
or groups interact have institutional connotations. 
Participation is yet another ingredient for institutional quality. The involvement and participation of 
civil society and various stakeholders in the decision making is an important component of petroleum resource 
revenue management. Active participation enhances productive institutions such as accountability and 
transparency strengthen decision making and the people are likely to gain the trust and confidence of the 
institutions. Democracy in theory allows for people to participate and access information. One corollary and 
advantage of participation is that people have the opportunity to contribute and make decisions and volition to 
reflect their interest (larger interest).  
Pratchett (1999) explains this saying that there is a relationship between ‘public participation and 
representative democracy’ the World Bank and others define public participation as “The process of engaging 
affected people and other interested parties in open dialogue through which a range of views and concerns can 
be expressed in order to inform decision-making and help build consensus. To be meaningful, consultation 
should be carried out in a locally appropriate manner, for example with information in local languages 
distributed in advance”. Consultation is an institution that encourages participation. Situations however, abound 
where the issue at hand is technical and the people may not have the capacity to participate; but the basic aim can 
still be to allow the people an opportunity to learn through the participation. Figure 3 is conceptual framework 
developed to demonstrate the relationship between petroleum revenue and institutions. 
Figure 3: The framework for understanding the relationship between petroleum resource revenue and 
institutions 
 
2.4 Importance of institutions in petroleum revenue management 
This part establishes that the role of institutions in the sustainable management of petroleum resources for 
socioeconomic development cannot be overemphasized. Thus institutions are crucial to overcoming the malady 
of the oil curse. It is against this background that the issue for policy makers is no more whether institutions do 
matter, but rather which institutions should be put in place and how such institutions can be acquired (Rodrick, 
2007). Institutions according to North (1990) are seen as important determinants of socioeconomic development 
in society. A possible remedy to the oil curse is being proffered by more emphasis on the role of institutions in 
economic development which gained momentum since 1990s. Steven (2008) further asserted that institutions can 
be the answer to the predacious conduct of bureaucrats and politicians in oil producing countries. 
Institutions wield an important effect on management, while the oil abundance and policy in itself does 
not except through their effect on institutions. When a country has weak institutions, managing petroleum 
resource revenue through such weak institutions can have negative outcomes (Eigen-Zucchi, 2003). The nature 
of institutions present at the time of oil discovery can determine whether that country can or cannot avoid the oil 
curse. Mehlum (2006) notes that a blend of weak institutions and oil wealth will lead to the oil curse. Contrary to 
the earlier arguments that petroleum wealth undermines economic development through weakening of 
institutions, there is rather a positive correlation between oil resource abundance and institutional quality 
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(Brunnschweiler, 2006). Brunnschweiler further remarks that abundance of oil resources in a country should lead 
to good institutions and economic growth. The reason is that countries with good institutions benefit more from 
the oil wealth because the people through institutions are able to manage revenues thereof (Ibironke, 2004).  
Research suggests that democracy and good institutions work together as the former helps create good 
institutions (Rodrick, 2007). One fundamental objective of every institution is to reduce unreasonable actions by 
individuals and to lessen conflict of interest among various stakeholders (Inforresources Focus, 2008). It is 
against this background that it is only by decoupling power and function and public involvement that institutions 
can serve the purpose of checks and balances and consequently ensure sustainable management of petroleum 
resource revenues (Ibironke, 2004). Acemoglu (2005) does indicate that institutions are very important in 
determining monetary returns. Relevant experience with oil booms always emphasizes the need for good 
institutions and public financial management (IMF, 2007).  
Institutions also play a distributional role in determining how petroleum resource revenues should be 
allocated and how responsibilities are assigned to various actors (Inforresources Focus, 2008). Thus institutions 
not only mobilize resources, but also how such resources are distributed among the beneficiaries (Acemoglu, 
2005). It is argued that the fundamental determinant of differences in socioeconomic development among 
nations is the differences in their economic institutions and that to be able to overcome these differences in 
development means reforming these institutions (Acemoglu, 2008). The issue of institutional quality is 
fundamental to understanding the oil curse because situations where institutions are weak (Nigeria), petroleum 
resources will lead to a growth curse and oil wealth becomes a blessing when the institutions are good (Norway) 
(Mehlum, 2005). Ross (2012) admits this by quoting the former US vice president, Dick Chiney as saying……. 
“The good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments”). This 
illustrates that; oil resources without good institutions such as democratic governance will result in the oil curse. 
The natural resource theory ascertains that there is a positive correlation between good institutions and economic 
development (Pessoa, 2008). It is an undeniable fact that good institutions attract FDI which is important in 
enhancing economic growth. As seen from the aforementioned analysis, capacity building of institutions 
especially oil rich countries in developing economies such as Angola, Nigeria is very important because such 
countries lack the necessary capacity to build up such institutions (Barbe, 1994).  
There is a debate as to whether weak institutions and bad policies are caused by the abundance of 
petroleum resources or it is that the petroleum resources make worse weak institutions and bad policies on 
economic growth (Arezki, 2007). Qureshi (2008) ascertains that natural resources only test the institutional 
arrangements of oil producing or exporting countries and that it is only countries with good institutions and 
efficient management systems that are able to pass this test and profit from their oil wealth. 
 
2.5 Are there good and effective institutions? 
It is necessary that institutions are good and effective as institutions in themselves may not perform the functions 
for which they are created. The literature so far indicates that countries with petroleum resources are cursed 
when they have weak institutions (Boschini, 2005). Good and effective institutions ensure that there is probity, 
transparency and accountability among politicians, thus making it possible for the oil revenue to be managed for 
the benefit of both present and future generations (Kalstad, 2007). Any social organization that ensures that the 
citizens have an effective, reliable and an enforceable property rights can be classified as being a good institution 
(Acemoglu, 2003).  Acemoglu (2003) emphasizes that the hallmarks of every good institution are the 
enforcement of property rights for the masses, restraint on the actions of politicians and other powerful groups in 
society and then institutions also make sure that there is a certain amount of equality among the citizenry. Good 
institutions are the medium through which local communities and the general public can be involved in the 
management of petroleum resources (Batra, 2006). 
 
2.6 What are the criteria for measuring good and effective institutions? 
Institutions according to North (1990) in themselves cannot be measured. There is no generally accepted 
standard yardstick against which institutions can be measured (Steven, 2008). Steven (2008) and colleague 
further argue that if it is not made clear as to what institutional quality is all about, it will be extremely difficult if 
not impossible to know whether the indicators being used to measure institutional quality will capture everything 
that they intend to measure. Since it is not easy to measure institutional quality, it is only important that external 
factors are used to evaluate the relative performance of institutions. 
The general notion is that good outcomes from petroleum resources are synonymous with good 
institutions (Steven, 2008). Rodrick and Subramania (2003) suggest that institutional quality can be measured 
using a multiple of external indicators ranging from the protection and enforcement of property rights to the 
strength of rule of rule in a particular country. Another indicator worth noting is checks and balances, thus the 
restraint on the legislature, executive and other arms of government (Rodrick and Subramania, 2003). 
The paper identifies some institutional indicators such as the United Nations HDI, Worldwide 
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Governance Indicators (WGI); GNIPC among others will be used to compare the three case studies (Nigeria, 
Norway and Saudi Arabia). These indicators are chosen because they can easily be obtained and are generally 
recognized and accepted worldwide. HDI measures the GDP, literacy rate, life expectancy and educational 
attainment for various countries. It measures human capital development in a country. WGI as the name suggests 
deals with issues of governance for Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia for 2000 and 2010. The six WGI used by 
the World Bank are: rule of law, the effectiveness of the government, quality of regulation, control of corruption, 
voice and accountability, and political stability and absence of violence (WGI, 2010). How much each citizen 
will receive if the annual income of the whole country were to be shared or divided equally among every 
woman, man and children in a particular country is what constitutes GNIPC. 
To find out the difference good institutions can make in terms of petroleum resource management, 
Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia in the next chapter are compared to find out why different outcomes out of 
the same petroleum resource in the three countries. The problem of the oil curse in Nigeria can be countered by 
good institutions. With good institutional frameworks in place, oil resources have the potential of turning the oil 
resources to benefiting a nation while the same oil resources in another country just like Nigeria can lead to the 
oil curse because of bad or weak institutions. Just as these countries; Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia 
discovered oil in 1956, 1961 and 1938 respectively, these countries are different in terms of their institutional 
experiences. While Norway has been one of the oldest countries with democratic credentials and firmly formed 
institutions, Nigeria ended their military reign just in 1999.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the impact of petroleum resources is dependent on 
the relationship between that country’s resources and the institutions. The Chapter explained the concept of 
institutions as the rules of the game that influence and regulate human behavior in the society. The study 
unearthed the criteria for measuring good and effective institutions using UN HDI, CPI, and GNIPC among 
others. A framework was developed to illustrate the relationship between institutions and oil wealth. The 
framework distinguishes two outcomes when hydrocarbons are discovered and developed in a nation thus the oil 
either becomes a blessing (sustainably developed and managed) or a curse (corruption characterized with 
mismanagement). The framework identifies human and social capital couple with public participation as 
significant ingredients for sustainable petroleum revenue management. 
The framework also presents that when a country has strong productive institutions such as 
transparency and accountability and weak destructive institutions like corruption, the petroleum wealth will be 
managed wisely. Conversely, weak productive institutions and strong destructive institutions will result in the oil 
curse. It also assesses the indicators for good and effective institutions (Human and social capital as well as 
participation of the civil society) and that productive institutions are likely to support sustainable revenue 
management whiles destructive and weak productive institutions (corruption) will hinder sustainable 
development and management. 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 Research Findings 
The fundamental issue faced by oil producing countries is how to turn the oil to benefit their citizens. 
Accomplishing this is not without strong and effective institutions. This part of the study seeks to bring to light 
the institutional literature (Findings) of the sample countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia). The findings are based fundamentally on the criteria for measuring good and effective institutions (the 
United Nations Human Development Index (HDI); Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Gross National 
Income Per Capita (GNIPC) among others. The second part identifies various institutions among the sample 
countries and their assigned roles in their respective oil and gas industries. 
 
3.1 Institutional literature of the sample countries 
The sample countries used for this research are: Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. I chose these three countries 
for the descriptive and comparative analysis because they are all endowed with petroleum resources, one 
(Norway) representing the developed world, the other (Nigeria) representing the developing economies and 
Saudi Arabia an epitome of the autocratic system and the largest and the leading country with petroleum 
reserves, production, exports and refining capacity in the world. The three sample countries have different levels 
of economic development and institutional quality. It is very important that the study chose Norway to illustrate 
that it is possible for every nation to astutely manage its petroleum resources provided there is a complementary 
relationship between institutions and oil wealth. 
Research has shown that oil producing or exporting countries are more corrupt than even the world 
average even if Norway is included (Tsalik et al, 2005). The general expectation is that petroleum wealth will 
help bolster rather than weaken institutions and state capacity in Nigeria. Contrary to this expectation, the 
various governors in Nigeria resist the capacity building of institutions because they take advantage of the 
situation and exercise their discretion over the policy making processes and allocation of the petroleum export 
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rents (Luong, 2004). Saudi Arabia, even though not a bastion of democracy, it is doing fairly well in terms of 
their petroleum resource revenue management (Katz et al, 2004). 
The literature also shows that Norway had good institutional quality for a long time while Nigeria and 
Saudi Arabia have weak institutional quality. It shows that a country like Norway with higher institutional 
quality is able to manage its petroleum resources better than Nigeria and Saudi Arabia with lower institutional 
quality. To determine the institutional quality of these three countries, the external factors or indicators of good 
institutions identified earlier would be used. 
Table 1: The relationship between country rankings for democracy, HDI and corruption perception index in 
Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia for 2011 
Democracy Country Rank of 2011 
Country Rank Score 
Nigeria 119 3.83 
Norway 1 9.8 
Saudi Arabia 161 1.77 
Human Development Index Rank, 2011 
Country Rank Score 
Nigeria 156 0.459 
Norway 1 0.943 
Saudi Arabia 56 0.77 
Corruption Perception Index Rank, 2011 
Country Rank Score 
Nigeria 143 2.4 
Norway 6 9 
Saudi Arabia 57 4.4 
Source: CPI, 2011, Economist Intelligent Units, Democracy Index 2011, HDI, 2011, World democracy Table, 
2011. 
The above table shows the country rankings and scores for Democracy, Human Development Index 
(HDI) and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. The figures used are the 
country ranking of 2011 for all three indicators. Norway in 2008 was ranked 7th, 14th and 2nd for Democracy, CPI 
and HDI respectively while Nigeria was 100th, 121st and 154th for the same indicators. Between 2000 and 2011 
Saudi Arabia’s HDI grew by an average of 0.55 %. While Norway improved (Democracy 1, CPI 6 and HDI 1) 
within the three year period (2008-2011), Nigeria got worse off (Democracy 119, CPI 143  and HDI 156) for its 
institutional quality indicators. Could Saudi Arabia have been democratic if it had not discovered oil? The 
system of governance that precede oil discovery persists i.e. Nations with effective democratic institutions 
continue in their path of institutional development, so is the canonical case of Saudi Arabia who practiced 
autocratic system since antiquity before it discovered oil (Steve, 2011). 
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Figure 4: The relationship between democracy, CPI and HDI 
 
Source: Economist Intelligent Units, Democracy Index 2011 
Figure 4: illustrates a situation where democracy is weak in a country with a high CPI, it leads to low or 
poor HDI. A critical analysis of table 2 and figure 3 demonstrates clearly why countries like Norway have 
become a model of success when it comes to petroleum revenue management. The 2008 and 2011 Human 
Development Indices indicate a consistent performance story of Norway and go to buttress the idea that good 
institutions are indeed critical to the sustainable management of petroleum resources. 
Figure 5: below also illustrates the Gross National Income Per Capita (GNIPC), Human Development 
Index (HDI) and the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. The GNIPC and PPP 
figures are for 2010 while HDI figures represent that of 2011. The three countries were selected because they 
form the basis for descriptive and comparative analysis of this research as cases of failure, success and fairly 
good respectively from which Ghana can learn. The GNIPC figures are in US$.  
Table 2: The relationship between HDI, GNIPC and PPP 
 
Nigeria Norway Saudi Arabia 
Human Development Index (HDI) 156 1 56 
Gross National Income Per Capita (GNIPC) 1,180 85,380 17, 200 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 2,160 57,130 23,900 
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Figure 5: The relationship between HDI Ranking, GNIPC and PPP 
 
Source: The author with data from World Bank, 2010.  
The figure above shows that low HDI has a positive correlation with high GNIPC. Norway performs 
better than Nigeria and Saudi Arabia in terms of HDI and GNIPC statistics. Norway has been pointed out as one 
of the countries with the highest GNIPC in the world (World Bank, 2010). 
The latest update of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project is provided by 
Kaufmann et al (2010) which covers about 213 countries. The WGI 2010 update also measures the six 
dimensions of governance as stated earlier in this paper. Some significant changes have occurred in governance 
between 2000 and 2010 with some improvements in regulatory quality in all three sample countries. Nigeria 
especially did well in the area of corruption control but however, it became relatively worse off in the rest of the 
four indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness 
and the rule of law). Norway has been able to maintain a high level of good governance over the ten year period. 
Saudi Arabia improved remarkably between the ten year period for effectiveness of Government, quality of 
regulation, rule of law and control of corruption. However, it performs badly for the voice and accountability and 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence within the same period. The table also demonstrates some 
relationship between good governance and sustainable management of petroleum resources. 
Table 3: Changes in the six dimensions of governance in Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia, 2000-2010 
Percentile Ranking 
(0-100) 
2000 2000 2000 2010 2010 2010 
Niger
ia Norway 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Niger
ia 
Norw
ay 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Voice and Accountability 30.3 96.2 8.7 27 100 3.8 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence 9.6 95.7 48.1 3.8 93.4 35.8 
Government Effectiveness 15.1 94.1 46.3 10.5 95.7 52.6 
Regulatory Quality 20.6 83.3 50.5 23 92.3 55 
Rule of Law 16.7 97.1 53.1 10.9 99.1 60.2 
Control of Corruption 6.8 97.1 40 15.8 97.1 62.2 
Source: World Bank, 2010. 
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Figure 6: The six dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
Source: the author with data from World Bank, 2010 
Norway is said to have been a model of success in oil revenue management in the world due to its 
effective institutions and good governance. The literature also shows that good governance, proper regulatory 
frameworks and anticorruption policies are crucial to sustainable management of petroleum resources (Limi, 
2006). Limi (2006) further asserts that if Nigeria can build the capacity of its institutions to the level of those of 
Norway, it will result in seven fold increase in GNIPC of Nigeria in the long run. If the tenets of the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) couple with voice and accountability are incorporated into the oil and gas 
industry in Saudi Arabia, it will in the future undoubtedly become a model of petroleum resource revenue 
management in the world. 
 
3.1 Identification of institutions in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia oil and gas industries 
Considering the fact that institutions are not universal and cannot be easily transferred from one country to 
another, this second part of the research findings identifies institutions responsible for sustainable development 
of petroleum resources in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. 
3.1.1 Institutions in Ghana’s oil and gas industry 
Ghana discovered petroleum resources in 2007 and started the production and export business in the third quarter 
of 2010. Ghana upon this, in 2010 passed into law a Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act, 815) to make 
available a framework for the collection, allocation and the management of petroleum resource revenue in 
Ghana. The Act provides that petroleum resource revenue management should be carried out in a responsible, 
accountable and transparent in such a way that it will benefit Ghanaians in accordance with the Article 36 of the 
constitution of the Republic of Ghana. The Act establishes a petroleum management account situated at the Bank 
of Ghana (BoG) and institutions that will assess collect and disburse the petroleum revenue. To ensure 
sustainable management of petroleum resources in Ghana, the Act provides for some Petroleum Funds (PFs) i.e. 
Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) and Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF). GSF is aimed to sustain the public 
expenditure of the economy of Ghana in times of revenue shortages whether as a result of oil price falls or 
adverse production changes. The object of the GHF is to provide an endowment fund for the sustainable 
development of petroleum resources for future generations through strategic investment in foreign assets even 
after the petroleum resources are completely depleted. 
To do this effectively and efficiently, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) sets up some 
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institutions with specific tasks to manage Ghana’s petroleum resource revenues. The institutions among others 
are; the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP), the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Revenue 
Investment Advisory Committee (RIAC) and the Bank of Ghana (BoG).  
Table 4: The institutions established by the Ghana Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act 815, 2010) 
Name of Institution                                                      Main Responsibility 
 
 
Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
planning 
• Develops an investment policy for the petroleum funds 
• Manages the Ghana petroleum funds 
• Takes investment and management decisions in consultation with the 
Investment Advisory Committee and the Governor of Bank of Ghana (BoG) 
• Enters into operations management with the BoG for the operational 
management of the petroleum funds of Ghana 
 
Ghana Revenue 
Authority (GRA) 
• Petroleum resource revenue due the Republic of Ghana from whatever source 
be it in or outside of Ghana shall be assessed, collected and accounted for by 
the Ghana Revenue Authority 
 
 
Revenue Investment 
Advisory Committee 
• Recommends to the minister of finance and economic planning the investment 
strategy and policy of the Ghana Petroleum Funds (GPFs) 
• Advises the minister of finance on the broad investment guidelines that should 
be provided BoG 
• Reviews and audits the GPFs 
 
 
Bank of Ghana 
• In charge of day to day operational management of the petroleum account 
under the terms of operations management agreement  
• Manages the petroleum reserves account astutely within the framework of 
operations and management strategy as provided by the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning 
Source: Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2010, (Act 815), Republic of Ghana 
The Act stipulates that management of the petroleum resources should give priority to the agricultural 
sector, infrastructure and service delivery in health and education, human capital development, strengthening of 
institutions, rural development, environmental management and the social well-being of the physically 
challenged or handicapped and other disadvantaged Ghanaians.  
Figure 7: Illustrates the institutions in Ghana’s oil and gas industry 
 
3.1.2 Institutions in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry 
A country endowed with petroleum resources like Nigeria must endeavor to utilize those resources maximally. 
The Federal government of Nigeria under the reign of the former president Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 instituted 
an Oil and Gas Sector Reform Implementation Committee (OGSRIC) to separate the commercial institutions 
from the policy making institutions in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria (Iledare, 2008). Unfortunately, 
Obasanjo’s administration could not carry out the proposed institutional restructuring exercise.  
Nigeria did not relent in its quest to restructure institutions in its oil and gas sector (Okogu, 2006). On 
7th September, 2007, the Federal government under the presidency of late Umaru Yar’Adua reconstituted the 
committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Riwlanu Lukman to transform the institutions in the oil and gas 
industry in Nigeria into functional institutional structures to be able to effectively manage the oil and gas 
industry in the country (Iledare, 2008). Iledare (2008) adds that the restructuring was supposed to facilitate the 
increment of Nigeria’s GDP to a level comparable to the top twenty (20) economies in the world by 2020. 
Because of the short-lived reign of Umaru Yar’Adua, the committee was dissolved after his death. However, 
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there is a Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) currently before the Nigerian National Assembly (NNA), aim to 
establish and make clear the rules and the institutions that will entrench good resource revenue management, 
transparency and accountability in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria (Okigbo, 2012).The Federal revenue 
collection and management institutions include: Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), the Nigerian Customs 
Service (NCS), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Department of Petroleum Resources and the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (Iledare and Suberu, 2010). 
Table 5: Petroleum revenue management institutions in the context of Nigerian Federal Fiscal System 
Name of Institution                                                      Main Responsibility 
Federal Inland Revenue 
Service 
• Responsible for collection of corporate tax in Nigeria 
Nigerian Customs Service • Collects excise and import duties 
Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation 
• In charge of managing the government participating interests in the oil 
and gas exploration and production 
Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
• Collects signature bonuses and royalties on behalf of Nigerian 
government 
Central Bank of Nigeria • In which the collected revenues are deposited 
Source: IAEE, 2008 
Figure 8: Petroleum revenue sharing and management institutions in the context of Nigerian Federal Fiscal 
regime 
 
Source: The author with data from World Bank, 2010 
The revenue at the Federation Account in the Central Bank of Nigeria devolved to the sub-national 
governments are shared among the states and the local government councils based on the following criteria: 
equality (equal amounts to each state or locality) 40%; population 30%; social development needs 10%; land 
mass and terrain 10%; and internal revenue generation effort 10% (Iledare and Suberu, 2010). Iledare (2010) and 
colleague add that, notwithstanding these constitutional and statutory provisions, the federal revenue sharing 
mechanism has continued to be one of the most intractable and contentious issues in Nigeria. Two issues have 
been particularly controversial, namely, the administration of the Federation Account and the weighting of the 
derivation principle. For the purposes of this study, the focus is put on the former. 
There is an issue concerning the Federal Account, which relates to the underpayment of centrally 
mobilized revenues into the Federal Account and some deductions that the Federal Government does before 
sharing among the various beneficiaries (Ekpo, 2007). These deductions entail the so-called memorandum items 
such as the NNPC Joint venture cash calls and priority projects, servicing of external debt, proceeds from excess 
crude and excess petroleum profit taxes and royalties (Iledare and Suberu, 2010). Other ‘illegal’ deductions, 
under the centrally controlled special funds, according to Iledare et al (2010) include allocations for the 
development of the federal capital territory, for ecological emergencies, for statutory revenue stabilization, and 
for the development of natural resources. Although the Supreme Court has nullified all of these deductions, the 
Federal Government still continues to redirect revenues purposed for the Federation Account, neglecting the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s ruling (Ekpo, 2007). While provisions for the special Stabilization Fund, 
Excess Crude Account, and collective Intergovernmental funding of investment obligations in the oil sector are 
sound in principle, the present modus operandi by which the Federal Government deducts huge sums of money 
from the Federation Account lacks transparency and accountability and consequently short-changes the states 
and local government councils by surreptitiously decreasing revenue pools for general Intergovernmental 
sharing. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling of a fiscally sound mechanism such as the excess crude 
account, whereas legally correct, raises the issue whether the Constitution is apt to Nigerians needs in this 
regard. 
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3.1.3 Institutions in Norway’s oil and gas industry 
Most countries have dedicated institutions for the management of petroleum resource revenues in their oil and 
gas sectors, and Norway is not exception in this respect. This management role is either dedicated to a ministry, 
or similar institutions embedded within another Ministry or department (The World Bank, 2009). Norway is, in 
many ways, different from Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. One common factor, however, among these countries is 
their endowness in oil and gas resources and the centrality of the petroleum resource revenues to their 
economies. A critical feature of the Norwegian petroleum management policy has been a well-defined division 
of roles and responsibilities among the different state institutions (Mark et al, 2011). Below are the institutions 
responsible for petroleum resource revenue management in Norway. 
Table 6: Petroleum revenue management institutions in Norway 
Institution’s name                                                      Main Responsibility 
 
 
The Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy 
• Responsible for management of petroleum resources in Norway. 
• Other responsibilities include; making sure that petroleum operation 
activities are undertaken in conformity with the standards set by 
parliament and the government. 
 
 
The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate 
• An administrative subordinate to the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy. It plays an important role in the petroleum resource 
management and serves as an advisory body to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. 
 
The Ministry of Finance 
• It is responsible for collecting taxes i.e. corporate tax, special 
petroleum tax, CO2 tax and NOx tax from the Norway’s petroleum 
sector. 
 
The Petroleum Tax Office 
• It is a department of the Ministry of Finance. Its core duty is to 
ensure that the right and correct assessment, mobilization and 
collection of petroleum taxes and fees in Norway. 
Source: Mark et al, 2011 
In Norway, there is no one particular arrangement to assign or share petroleum resource revenues 
between the three tiers of government; the Central, the Counties (18) and the Municipalities (431) (IMF, 
2009).The municipalities’ budget is five times more than the counties. Petroleum resource revenues are paid to 
the central government only. Unlike Nigeria, Norway has a petroleum fund which was established initially as a 
fiscal policy tool to support the sustainable management of petroleum revenues in 1990 (IMF, 2009). The 
petroleum fund was rechristened as the Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF-G) in 2006 as part of the 
country’s effort to broaden pension reforms, bringing to light the GPF-G’s role in meeting the rapid increase in 
public pension expenditures in future years, but at the same time not earmarking its resources for any other 
purposes (Government Pension Fund Act No.123, 20th December, 2005). 
Figure 9: Petroleum revenue management institutions Norway 
 
Source: The author 
Figure 9: indicates that the institutional framework and the division of responsibilities are clearly spelt 
out. Transparency is the hallmark of the Norwegian petroleum revenue management system, a leader in 
petroleum resource revenue management transparency. Norway’s management system is highly decentralized 
with emphasis on integrity and proper functioning of government institutions. There is an apparent policy on the 
management of petroleum resource revenues. The various institutions also make available revenue management 
information to the general public. Unlike Nigeria, the petroleum revenue in Norway is entrusted to various 
institutions with the following management functions; the counties are in charge of regional planning and 
development such as transport, business development, secondary education, dental health and cultural services. 
Municipalities are responsible for fire prevention and control, care for the aged and disabled, waste management 
primary education, kindergartens, sanitation and water management. While the counties and municipalities have 
autonomy, most of their management and operation activities are regulated and subject to standard practices set 
by the central government. The revenue management institutions in Norway are given legal protection against 
politicians and other arms of government.  
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3.1.4 Institutions in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas industry 
No successful petroleum industry can be attained without innovative, good and flexible institutions. Effective 
petroleum resource revenue management is achieved through strategic human and social capital development 
(Drysdale, 2007) i.e. continuous training and development of specialist human capital to take up management 
responsibilities in those institutions such as the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs (SCPMA), 
and Saudi Aramco. It is against this background that this part of the research seeks to identify the petroleum 
revenue management institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas industry. The table below shows 
the various institutions and their management roles. 
Table 7: Petroleum revenue management institutions in Saudi Arabia 
Petroleum revenue management institutions in Saudi Arabia 
Institution’s name                                                      Main Responsibility 
 
 
The Ministry of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources 
• Responsible for administering and monitoring policies related to the 
petroleum industry in Saudi Arabia. 
• Other responsibilities include; making sure that affiliate companies such 
as Saudi Arabian Company (Saudi Aramco), Aramco Gulf Operation 
Ltd (AGOC), Saudi Texaco, operating activities are undertaken in 
conformity with the standards set by the government. 
 
 
The Supreme Council for 
Petroleum and Mineral 
Affairs 
• It serves as the link between Saudi Arabia oil industry and the 
government 
• It designs the kingdom’s petroleum management policies and strategies 
• It takes charge of general petroleum industry be it policy, management 
or strategy 
 
 
 
 
The Saudi Arabia Company 
(Saudi Aramco) 
• Just like NNPC, Saudi Aramco is also responsible for the management 
of government participating interest and pays taxes, returns and profits 
to the government. It rather generates revenue for the government. It 
also engages in exploration and production activities. The petroleum 
resource revenue management in Saudi Arabia is solely entrusted to the 
SCPMA. SCPMA membership is composed of members of the royal 
family, government ministers and the oil industry leaders. 
Source: OPENENERGYINFO, 2012.  
 
Figure 10: Institutions in Saudi Arabia oil and gas industry 
 
Finally, the chapter concludes that countries vary in so many aspects, so are institutions. As seen from 
the above findings, the sample countries institutions were measured against the standards of the UN HDI, WGI, 
and GNIPC to find out how strong and effective they are on the management of oil revenues. Sadly, apart from 
Norway, the rest of the sample countries do not have strong and effective institutions. All of the samples 
countries have had institutions to manage their petroleum industry and resources thereof. While some countries 
like Ghana, Norway and Saudi Arabia manage their petroleum resources at the central level, Nigeria contrarily 
decentralizes its petroleum resource management. Based on the literature reviewed so far, it is only important to 
attempt to discuss the findings in the three case countries and analysis of lessons Ghana can derive from such a 
discussion. The discussion of the analysis is premised on the indicators for good and effective institutions 
identified early on in this study. Accordingly, transparency and accountability are the only sure way to counter 
the destructive institutions in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. The important thing that can be learned 
from the theoretical study and the quantitative data from Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia is that good 
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institutions correlate with sustainable management of petroleum resources. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 Discussion: An Analysis of the Findings 
There is a plethora of theories to delve into in the area of management, with institutional theory being used 
widely to explore a range of research challenges. In the field of institutions, the use of institutional theory 
remains at the developing stage, with much potential for espousal (Weerakkody et al, 2009). This chapter 
concerns the application of institutional theory to the topic of petroleum revenue management institutions in 
Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. 
The academic literature examined so far has focused on conceptual issues such as participation, social 
and human capitals. The concepts analyzed petroleum resource revenue management with regards to the concept 
of sustainability. Thus any country that utilizes its oil resource endowment will be on the path of sustainability if 
it invests the revenue accrued on other capitals such as human, physical or institutional. 
There are other factors crucial to determining economic growth beside availability of petroleum and 
other natural resources; political stability, over dependence on aid, isolationism trade policies, defective social 
services, geographical issues, limited or inadequate financial know-how  (Woolcock, et al, 2001). Determining 
the factors that cause economic stagnation and low or bad institutional quality can be difficult. For example, the 
curse of corruption, conflict and civil unrest and oil revenue mismanagement in a country such as Nigeria could 
be as a result of other factors and not necessarily intrinsic to their oil wealth. Indonesia for instance, some time 
ago experienced recurrent conflict and corruption, however, Indonesia is still considered by many as one of the 
countries that escaped the oil malady (Rosser, 2007). 
Another issue worthy of mentioning is foreign aid to developing countries like Ghana, Nigeria among 
others. Aid might have consequences similar to inflows of oil revenue. The developing or third world countries 
are normally the recipients of these aids and in a situation where for example, Nigeria who produces oil; it is 
sometimes difficult to point out whether the bad institutions are as a result of the aid or the oil wealth or even 
poverty. In both situations there is an inflow of huge revenue with little effort, and eventually, the same 
economic issues i.e. absorption problems, exchange rate issues and institutional weaknesses, thus bad financial 
management practices, corruption and mismanagement. This eventually benefits the developed economies more 
than the developing countries.  Africa’s development predicaments could partly be attributed to the foreign aid. 
Conflict as a destructive institution in Nigeria and other African oil producing countries may not be as a 
result of the oil resources. Though most African civil wars have purposefully drawn attention to the need to 
curtail access of the rebel movement to resource rich areas, these conflicts may not at all be related to oil 
resources (Nkandawire, 2002). A distinction between the battle for control over petroleum resources and 
religious and ethnic conflict currently going on in Nigeria must be drawn. As indicated earlier, conflict can 
impact on institutional quality and some of these institutions can exhibit stubborn tenacity .It is important to add 
that bad or weak institutional factors may be due to past conflicts. Therefore, countries who are rebuilding their 
institutions are more susceptible to the oil curse irrespective of their natural resource wealth. Likewise, countries 
like Ghana, Nigeria who are freed from colonial ties, especially a situation where the Great Britain (colonizers) 
neglected to invest in the local institutions, will definitely struggle to develop such institutions and can easily fall 
victims of the oil curse; so is Nigeria. The table below shows institutions as a function of human and social 
capitals and participation. 
Table 8: Institutions as a function of Participation, Human and Social Capital 
KIND OF 
INSTITUTION 
GHANA NIGERIA NORWAY SAUDI ARABIA 
Human Capital  
X 
 
X 
    
Social Capital   
X 
 
X 
   
X 
Participation  
X 
 
X 
 
  
 
X 
Source: the author 
Depending on the level of development of the countries concerned, the oil revenues could be used in 
three different ways. A developed country like Norway can afford to establish petroleum funds (future 
generations’ fund), countries like Ghana and Nigeria still developing will need to invest the oil revenues in 
projects with human and social outcomes. A country like Saudi Arabia in the middle stages of development can 
invest in infrastructure to improve their economic productivity through diversification. Ghana, Nigeria, Saudi 
Arabia will require institutions with the ability to restrain personal and group interests of politicians and 
bureaucrats in order to make best use of their petroleum resources. 
As mentioned earlier, because it is not easy to measure institutional quality, it is only important that 
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external factors such as the UN Human Development Index (HDI), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
and Gross National Per capita Income (GNIPC) among others are used to show how the theory is applied. 
Table 9: The relative HDI, Democracy and CPI scores as an indicator of good and effective institutions among 
the sample countries 
Country HDI Score Democracy Score Corruption Perception Score 
Ghana 0.541 6.02 3.9 
Nigeria 0.459 3.83 2.4 
Norway 0.943 9.8 9 
Saudi Arabia 0.77 1.77 4.4 
 
Figure 11: Human Development Index as an indicator of good and effective institutions 
 
Source: the author with data from HDI, 1980-2011  
HDI is a composite index measuring average achievement in the three basic components of; long and 
healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. HDI as a measure of institutional quality is based on data 
from Human Development Index Trends, 1980-2011. The index score for a country is between 0 and 1. Very 
high HDI is between 1-0.793, high, 0.783-0.698, medium 0.698-0.522 and low is 0.510-0.286 where a higher 
score means better and effective institutions. Norway (0.943) and Saudi Arabia (0.77) met the threshold for very 
high and high HDI respectively. Since Human Development encompasses the level of employment, knowledge, 
skills and quality of life of people, a higher score indicates that institutions are effective in delivering hence the 
high scores associated with Norway and Saudi show a measure of quality and effective institutions in the two 
countries. Ghana also falls within the category of countries with medium HDI score of 0.541. Ghana needs to do 
more to enable her climb up the ladder. Nigeria ranks 156 out of 187 countries with an HDI score of 0.459, 
which by United Nations (UN) standards is below world average. Although it is not apparent the link between 
HDI and institutional quality, it is obvious that a country like Norway has had good and effective institutions for 
a very long time whiles a country like Nigeria and somehow, Ghana have had relatively weak institutional 
quality since Ghana’s score is close to the average. It is observed that countries like Norway and Saudi Arabia 
with high HDI have managed their petroleum resource revenue better than a country like Nigeria with low HDI. 
Whiles Ghana, Norway and Saudi Arabia made progress in terms of HDI growth from 2000- 2011, Nigeria 
retrogressed in its HDI efforts. From2000-2011, Ghana averagely grew by 1.66%, thus a figure higher than the 
world average, Norway and Saudi Arabia grew by 0.29% and 0.55% respectively within the same period. This 
means that if Ghana continues its efforts to invest in human capital development, then it could move from 
medium (0.541) to high. The table below shows the human capital trends in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi 
Arabia. 
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Table 10: Human Capital Trends, 1980-2011 
1980 1990 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 
Ghana 0.385 0.418 0.451 0.484 0.527 0.533 0.541 
Nigeria 0 0 0 0.429 0.449 0.454 0.459 
Norway 0.796 0.844 0.913 0.938 0.941 0.941 0.943 
Saudi Arabia 0.651 0.693 0.726 0.746 0.763 0.767 0.77 
Source: United Nations HDI 2011 
Figure 12: Human Capital Development trends in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia 
 
Source: the author with data from the United Nations HDI, 2011 
The figure above shows the HDI performance of the various countries from 1980-2011. The figures 
could not be obtained in Nigeria for 1980, 1990 and 2000. From the above analysis, it is clear that Ghana, 
Nigeria and Saudi Arabia do not need strong men; they need strong institutions and effective governance. 
Another indicator used for measuring institutions is Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as illustrated below. 
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Figure 13: Corruption perception as an indicator of good and effective institutions 
 
 
Source: the author with data from CPI, 2011. 
Corruption Perception as a measure of institutional quality figures are obtained from the Corruption 
Perception Index, 2011. The score for each country is 0-10. 0 signifies very or highly corrupt and 10 means that 
the country is clean or least corrupt. Out of 183 countries collated, Nigeria ranks 143 with a score of 2.4, which 
again is below world average. Norway scores 9.0, Saudi Arabia4.4 and Ghana 3.9. Apart from Norway, the rest 
of the three countries could not make the average score of 4.9. 
Another important issue worthy of noting is the quality of political systems in the sample countries. 
Norway, unlike Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, has had a stable democratic system, free or unrestricted media, 
and leaders that are accountable to the people, and not like General Sani Abacha and the King of Saudi Arabia 
who amassed oil wealth to the detriment of the masses. Norway has an impartial and a consensus oriented 
parliamentary system that helps to plan for long term development goals (Eifert, et al, 2003). Unlike African 
politics, the government in power or the majority does not see anything good about the opposition (minority). 
Parochialism and partisanship are the hallmarks of Nigerian and for that matter African politics. When there is a 
change of government in the case of Africa, the new government abandons any project started by the previous 
government and starts a new agenda all together. Norway has had a series of change of government and none of 
the changes have affected their national development agenda. 
Unfortunately, the change of government in Africa is like change of almost all the top and middle 
managers of these institutions because the new government comes with its own people to work with. Until there 
is a paradigm shift in African politics to concentrate on a sustainable national development agenda, African 
institutions will not be strengthened so long as change of governments continues. The US president (Barrack 
Obama, 2009) captured this when he says…… “In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions 
are the key success. Strong parliaments, honest police force, independent judges, and independent press, a viable 
private sector and civil society are the things that give life to democracy because these are the things that matter 
in people’s everyday life…..”The legal system of Norway (a combination of customary, civil and common law 
traditions) is also a contributory factor to its success story. The figure below illustrates the institutional quality 
(good governance) of the sample countries. 
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Figure 14: Measure of institutional quality (good and effective governance) 
 
Source: the author with data from the United Nation HDI, 2011 
The institutional literature also demonstrates that high levels of institutional capital (good governance) 
which is a function of human and social capitals (the 2 caps) and participation made it less probable for a country 
like Norway to find itself in the devil’s excrement.  In the UNDP Working Paper, 2011, institutional capital is 
synonymous with good governance. It is against this background that the percentile ranking of the sample 
countries is analyzed to indicate the effectiveness of their governments and institutions.  
 
4.1 Human capital 
A critical analysis of the figures in table 8 illustrates why Norway is a model of success when it comes to 
sustainable management of oil and gas resources. Saudi Arabia is within a good range, Ghana is in the lower 
medium whiles Nigeria is at the bottom, an epitome of failure. Statistics in figure 5 show that a country with a 
low HDI ranking is synonymous with high GNIPC. As shown above, Norway ranks number 1 with the highest 
GNIPC of US$85, 380 and Nigeria again scoring 156 and US$1180 for HDI and GNIPC respectively. Though 
Ghana has not performed well, it has a better rating relative to Nigeria in terms of HDI and GNIPC correlation. 
Ghana score is 0.541: US$1, 240 for HDI and GNIPC respectively, whereas Nigeria is 0.459: US$1, 180 for HDI 
and GNIPC for the same time period. Ghana’s relative performance in this regard could be as a result of her 
relative democratic credentials i.e. Ghana adopted the democratic system of governance before Nigeria; 1992, 
1999 respectively. 
The human capital in Ghana and Nigeria are limited especially in the latter which can be attributed to 
the prevailing oil curse in Nigeria, and this can be a big threat if not tackled could lead to the oil curse in Ghana. 
Furthermore, because of low literacy and low standard of education in developing countries, and the resultant 
limited HC, implies that there are few people who can hold the government accountable. The institutional 
literature highlighted data of limited human capital within the various institutions. The literature measures 
human capital in the sample countries using HDI. Ghana’s relative limited human capital (0.541) could lead to 
Ghana being eluded of its quest to sustainably manage and develop its petroleum resources. Let it be quick to 
add that limited human capital in this sense does not mean the people of Ghana and Nigeria do not have the 
ability to learn, rather it is used to indicate that the pool of knowledge and skills of the people is not developed 
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enough to face the challenges associated with petroleum resource revenue management. For Ghana to manage 
her oil resources prudently, it must therefore endeavor to develop her human capital across government 
institutional machinery. For instance, the Investment Advisory Committee requires the capacity to carry out their 
responsibilities. 
 
4.2 Social capital 
Social capital is yet another important element of petroleum resource revenue management institutions which 
can affect oil revenue management. There is generally lack of trust between the masses, the civil society, the 
media and the government especially in Nigeria as evident in their rule of law, voice and accountability and 
corruption perception. The ties between the politicians, government officials and their cronies tend to propagate 
destructive institutions such as corruption, favoritism, and violence as a means for registering political dissent in 
2010 tends to be high in Ghana (52.4%), Nigeria (96.2%), and Saudi Arabia (64.2%); (World Bank, 2010). 
The literature reveals that the relationship between the media, civil society, the opposition and the 
government (democracy) in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia indicate an absence of bridging social capital i.e. 
the negative sense of the dichotomy between ‘us and others’. Lack of social capital in Ghana and Nigeria is not 
surprising because of the institutional history of these two countries compared with Norway and Saudi Arabia. 
Ghana and Nigeria were both colonized and administered by Great Britain; the two nations were ruled by 
‘others’. This institutional history is said to have influenced their social capital development where the masses do 
not see themselves as part of the government. 
The latest update on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) was provided by Kaufmann et al 
(2010). The indicators measure the institutional quality of the sample countries based on the six dimensions 
identified earlier in this paper. The effectiveness of each indicator ranges between 0-100 whiles 0-means weak 
and 100 signifies very strong. Nigeria’s improvement in regulatory quality and control of corruption is traceable 
to their choice to end the military reign and start democracy in the second quarter of 1999. Nigeria performs 
retrogressively on the rest of the four indicators (rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability and 
absence of violence and voice and accountability). Political violence still continues to persist in Nigeria. Good or 
effective governance is reflected in the quality of public institutions, the quality of the civil service, and the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation all of which are dependent on human capital development of a 
nation (Kaufmann et al, 2010). Apparently, with the exception of Norway and Saudi Arabia who have improved 
on their governance effectiveness from 2000 to 2010 from 94.1, 46.3 to 95.7, 52.6 respectively, Ghana and 
Nigeria reduced in the governance effectiveness by 0.04% and 30% respectively within the same time period 
because of increasing poverty. 
The study also discussed issues that have been raised in the literature and which may be helpful to 
Ghana. Different levels of human and social development present different outcomes from the management of 
petroleum resources. The analysis suggests that developing countries such as Ghana, Nigeria among others 
should use their petroleum resource revenues to fund basic needs such as education, health services, food and 
water and sanitation and infrastructure. Saudi Arabia which is in the development ladder could use its oil revenue 
to transit the economy through research and development and investment in the human capital development and 
democracy ethos. 
 Social capital is critical for institutional development. Low social capital for example, through the 
incessant exclusion of women or political oppression, human and social capital development cannot take place. 
The uprisings that characterized North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 indicate that, advances in agate 
economic social outcomes that are not accompanied by public participation and protection of human rights, are 
not sustainable (UNDP, 2011). 
 
4.3 Corruption 
Fundamental to prudent petroleum revenue management are issues of accountability and responsibility. 
Institutions are instituted to help mitigate the challenges associated with many sectors of governance including 
petroleum revenue management; however, until measures are put in place to ensure accountability, transparency 
and responsibility, petroleum revenue management institutions in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia will forever 
remain weak. Holding politicians and decision makers accountable and responsible is the duty of civil society 
and the media; unfortunately, these countries with the exception of Norway suppress the media through voice 
and accountability. The challenge in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia oil and gas sectors is how to enforce 
accountability and responsibility. 
The analysis shows that corruption is an issue in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. For Nigeria, to the 
extent that some underpayments to and deductions from the Federal Account (FA) is deemed illegal and 
unconstitutional, yet the practice still persists (Iledare et al, 2010). It is also claimed that the former president 
General Sani Abacha embezzled about US$40 billion of which about 90% came from the oil revenue during his 
military regime in the 1990s (Bainomugisha et al, 2006). For Ghana, corruption is potentially a problem for the 
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astute management of petroleum revenue. The institutional revelation of corruption in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi 
Arabia is scaled to bad governance where the institutions can further be weakened. 
Corruption perception in Ghana and Nigeria can be said to be an institutional legacy of their colonial 
masters (Great Britain). Corruption, nepotism, favoritism and collusion started as early as the colonial era, and to 
have people at the ‘top’ doing you favors was common in Ghana and Nigeria during the colonial rule and has 
been carried through to present day where people offer gifts to get contracts and other favors rather than based 
on merit. 
Whiles corruption as a strong destructive institution is fading out in Norway, losing grip in Saudi 
Arabia, being frowned upon in Ghana; it is yet to lose its grips in Nigeria.  Corruption is a two way traffic i.e. the 
giver and the recipient. High levels of corruption in African oil producing countries such as Nigeria can be 
blamed on two internal factors and one external factor. The corruption in Nigeria’s revenue management 
institutions can be attributed to ethical and poverty issues. Whiles the external factor comes from the IOCs who 
provide financial inducements to politicians who, in turn, extend contracts and other favors to oil people in a 
vicious cycle of ‘you scratch my back, I scratch yours’ type of behavior (Bainomugisha et al, 2006). According 
to Economist Intelligent Units Democracy Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia both 
have low scores in managing the petroleum resource revenues accrued due to corruption. Stunted growth, stifled 
production (since petroleum revenue makes it easier to purchase things instead of to produce them), and an oil 
political and economic oligarchy in Nigeria may be attributed to effects of corruption. With this kind of 
corruption levels in Nigeria, it goes to buttress the point that the politicians and bureaucrats exercise their power 
and discretion over the petroleum resource revenue for the private gain of their families and cronies at the 
expense of the masses and still go with impunity because the rule of law is ineffective. 
 
4.4 Lessons Ghana can derive from Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia 
The discovery of oil and gas resources in Ghana in 2007 offered her a unique opportunity to learn from other 
countries i.e. some being oil cursed and others model of success. The Ghanaian government has since 2007 made 
frantic efforts to escape the oil curse. Ghana has designed institutions that will manage her petroleum resources 
based on international best practices. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act, 815) of 2010 is Ghana’s 
model for sustainable management of petroleum resource revenue. However, other institutions such as the BoG, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP), the Investment Advisory Committee (IAC), the Ghana 
Revenue Authority (GRA) are also important. Managed by these institutions, Ghana’s petroleum revenue in 
theory may be managed sustainably. These institutions constituted, however, are not tested in this regard, 
irrespective of any potential strength they wield; they cannot ensure sustainable management of Ghana’s oil 
revenue without: 
Good governance and effective institutional framework; effective petroleum revenue management rests 
on strong and effective institutional framework. Much of the literature on the oil curse points to the direction of 
institutional weakness (lack of rule of law, bad governance, corruption, poor human and social capital 
development) as the major cause of the oil curse especially in Nigeria (UNDP, 2011).  Norway’s success record 
is not attributed to a single factor; rather a set of policies and frameworks that worked together coupled with 
effective institutions (UNDP, 2011) that Ghana can emulate. 
Transparency and accountability; it is important for Ghana to learn that oil curse cannot be escaped, and 
mismanagement of petroleum revenue cannot be avoided without transparency and accountability among its oil 
revenue management institutions. Transparency and accountability are seen as crucial to tackling challenges of 
corruption and mismanagement of petroleum revenues. Ghana has to strengthen the institutional capacity of its 
revenue management institutions through capacity building and in-service training programmes as well as its 
media to report incidences and rumors of corruption and make further inquiries to corroborate such claims. 
Media discussions of petroleum revenue management issues are important and need to be encouraged in Ghana, 
so that Ghanaians can take the government to account. 
It is also important for Ghana to understand that there is nothing inherently cursed about oil as many 
perceive. To sustainably develop and manage her petroleum resources and revenue, Ghana has to invest in the 
human and social capital of her institutions. The literature illustrates that it will be extremely difficult if not 
impossible to prudently manage huge inflows of oil revenue without the requisite human capital in place. 
Ghana’s HDI score of 0.541for 2011 means that a lot needs to be done in this direction. The literature also 
authenticates Nigeria’s oil curse as a factor of limited human capital development (0.459 HDI, 2011), and affirms 
Norway’s success story of quality human capital development through her institutions.  
All in all, the malady of the oil curse is not just simply an economic issue. The role of institutional 
factors cannot be over emphasized in determining whether Ghana can escape the oil curse or not. It is clear from 
the literature and the conceptual framework developed that, effective or ineffective institutions are a function of 
participation, human and social capitals and that Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia do not have effective and 
vibrant institutions to sustainably develop and manage their petroleum resource revenue. However, all hope is 
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not lost, great potential exists that especially Ghana can utilize, this is discussed in detail in the conclusion and 
recommendation session. For now, it is important to point out that the stock of human and social capitals as well 
as participation is crucial to establishing strong and effective oil revenue management institutions. Ghana will be 
at the core of overcoming the oil malady and ensuring sustainable development and management if she takes 
clues from Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia by enforcing participation, accountability, responsibility, 
transparency, good governance and investing in human and social capitals of its petroleum revenue management 
institutions such as the BoG, MFEP, IAC and the GRA. 
The chapter concludes that the role of public participation through decision making, human and social 
capital in making an institution effective and strong cannot be over emphasized. While human capital helps to 
strengthen institutional choices and framework, participation and social capital ensure trust and all inclusive 
decision making. The analysis also finds out that apart from Norway and Saudi Arabia who have the right human 
capital in place, Ghana and Nigeria are yet to make that bold step. The CPI is said to be high in Ghana, Nigeria 
and Saudi Arabia. Ghana, Norway and Saudi Arabia have good governance. 
Ghana has a unique opportunity to learn from others. Ghana’s revenue management institutions need to 
be transparent and accountable to the people of Ghana. From South Korea to Singapore, history has shown that 
countries thrive when they invest in their people and in the right infrastructure. With strong institutions and a 
strong will, Ghana, Nigeria among others can live their dreams of sustainable resource revenue development and 
management. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 Conclusion and recommendation 
Managing petroleum resource revenue and turning it into a sustainable treasure is a challenging issue. The study 
explores the role of institutional factors in the sustainable development and management of petroleum resources 
in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway and Saudi Arabia. The study started with an introduction, problem statement, 
objectives of the study, the methodology, definition of terms and concepts and the contribution of the work to 
knowledge on the institutional aspects of the oil curse. Academic literature was extensively reviewed among 
such issues covered included the definition of institutions as the rules of the game that influence human behavior 
in society (North, 1990) as used in the study. Institutions are either formal or informal. A framework was 
developed to illustrate the relationship between institutions and oil wealth. The framework distinguishes two 
outcomes when hydrocarbons are discovered and developed in a nation thus the oil either becomes a blessing 
(sustainably developed and managed) or a curse (corruption characterized with mismanagement). The 
framework identifies human and social capital couple with public participation as significant ingredients for 
sustainable petroleum revenue management. 
The framework also presents that when a country has strong productive institutions such as 
transparency and accountability and weak destructive institutions like corruption, the petroleum wealth will be 
managed wisely. Conversely, weak productive institutions and strong destructive institutions will result in the oil 
curse. The framework is shown below 
Figure 15: The framework for understanding the relationship between petroleum resource revenue and 
institutions 
 
It is also found out that the quality of institutions that precede the discovery of oil resources play a 
major role in determining whether that country can escape the oil curse or not. A blend of weak institutions and 
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oil resources results in the oil curse. The importance of institutions is also highlighted as they serve to check the 
predacious conduct of bureaucrats and politicians in oil producing countries. The fundamental objective of every 
institution is to reduce selfishness and unreasonable behavior by individuals in the society. Institutions also 
determine how oil revenue and responsibilities are assigned among the various actors. 
Good and effective institutions are not easy to measure. There is no one generally accepted standard 
measure of institutions. To be able to do this the study used the United Nations HDI, WGI, and GNIPC among 
others. The study adopted these because they are easy to obtain and widely accepted. The HDI measures the 
GDP, life expectancy, literacy rate and educational attainment among the various countries. HDI also measures 
the human capital development. WGI as a measure of good and effective institutions deals with issues of good 
governance, quality of regulation, control of corruption, voice and accountability and political stability and 
absence of violence. The tables below indicate the relative performance of HDI, and WGI among the sample 
countries. This study contributes to knowledge on the literature of the institutional challenges of petroleum 
revenue management especially in Ghana.  
Figure 16: Human Development Index as an indicator of good and effective institutions 
 
HDI Score, 2011
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ghana Nigeria Norway Saudi
Arabia
0.541
0.459
0.943
0.77
R
el
a
tiv
e 
Sc
o
re
s
HDI Score, 2011
KEY
1-0.793 = Very High HDI
0.783-0.698 =High HDI
0.698-0.522=Medium HDI
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.9, 2016 
 
51 
Figure 17: The six dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
A careful analysis of the literature on the oil curse unearthed the conventional notion of the institutional 
aspect that the petroleum wealth affects institutional quality. In countries like Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria; 
an inflow of oil windfalls led to corruption, conflict and petroleum revenue waste. Yet, some countries like 
Canada, Norway, US among others; institutions were less affected by the inflow of oil windfalls. The 
institutional pre-requirement seemed to be a crucial factor in escaping the oil curse. 
Petroleum revenue management is also affected by the quality of institutions. Strong destructive 
institutions and weak productive institutions militate against the sustainable development and management of 
petroleum revenues, whereas, strong productive institutions support the sustainable development and 
management of petroleum resources. The distinction between cursed institutions (corruption, conflict and 
revenue mismanagement) and those institutions that are cursed as a result of petroleum wealth needs to be 
drawn. Sadly, people (politicians and other minority groups) who benefit from destructive institutions are likely 
to work towards sustaining them. Transparency and accountability (strong productive institutions) can be 
enforced to counter corruption (destructive institution). 
The framework developed in figure 3 shows that participation, human and social capitals are important 
determining factors of institutional quality and thus necessary for sustainable development and management of 
petroleum resources. Low levels of human capital (HDI) especially in Ghana and Nigeria imply that the skills, 
knowledge and competences needed to manage oil revenue require development. Pessimists say that if human 
capital is not developed, Nigeria will continue to mismanage its oil revenue through corruption, and Ghana will 
sooner than later finds herself in the ‘devil’s excrement’.  
Social capital also affects petroleum revenue management. The trust between the civil society and 
government is important in managing oil revenues. Social capital however, can have negative connotations. For 
example, the social capital (trust) between friends and family members can lead to corruption, favoritism and 
nepotism. With the limited human and social capital among the civil society, it will be difficult for the civil 
society to participate meaningfully in oil revenue management decisions, hence it will be impossible to build and 
maintain productive institutions in such a situation. Apparently, these are issues of concern not only for Ghana, 
Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, but also all oil producing and exporting countries. 
The study also identifies the petroleum revenue management institutions in Ghana, Nigeria, Norway 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For Ghana, the petroleum revenue management institutions are contained in it 
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a Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act 815, 2010). The institutions established include; Ghana Revenue 
Authority (GRA), who collects and accounts for all petroleum revenues that are due the Republic of Ghana, the 
Bank of Ghana (BoG) in charge of daily operational management of the petroleum account, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) who is responsible for revenue management and investment decisions 
in consultation with the with the Investment Advisory Committee (IAC) and the IAC recommends and advises 
the minister of the MFEP on the investment strategies of the Petroleum Funds (PFs). Nigeria in 2000 planned to 
restructure its oil and gas industry institutions in order to decouple management and commercial institutions 
from the policy making institutions, but failed. This restructuring exercise was attempted two times (2000 and 
2007) by the two former presidents; Olusegun Obasanjo and the late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua respectively. 
Nigeria’s oil revenue management institutions include; the Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) collects the 
corporate tax, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) manages Nigeria’s government participatory 
interest in the petroleum exploration and development activities, while the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) collects signature bonuses and royalties on behalf of the government and are paid into the Federal 
Account (FA) located at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). It is discovered that some underpayments are being 
made into the (FA) and that the Federal Government of Nigeria makes some deductions from the FA which are 
deemed illegal and unconstitutional. In Norway, the functions are that the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
manages the petroleum resources with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate as its administrative subordinate. 
The tax mobilization lies with the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum and the Petroleum Tax Office ensures that 
the right amount of revenue is collected and paid into the petroleum account. One fundamental feature about the 
Norwegian institutional framework is that institutional roles are clearly defined. Saudi Arabia has a unique 
system. The Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs (SCPMA) is the sole manager of Saudi 
Arabia’s petroleum wealth. It collects and designs strategies as to how the oil revenue should be managed. The 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and Saudi Aramco only play policy and commercial roles. The 
SCPMA is composed of members of the royal family and the leaders of the government. While some countries 
like Ghana, Norway and Saudi Arabia manage their petroleum resources at the central level, Nigeria contrarily 
decentralizes its petroleum resource management. 
The study presents a unique opportunity for Ghana to learn. Ghana’s plans to ensure sustainable oil 
revenue management are theoretically and potentially possible. The Ghanaian government has designed 
institutions as indicated above (BoG, GRA, IAC, and MFEP) under the PRMA to manage her oil revenue based 
on international best practices. The PRMA also established two petroleum funds; Ghana Stabilization Fund 
(GSF) and Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF). GSF is aimed to sustain the public expenditure of the economy in times 
of revenue shortages whether as a result of oil price falls or adverse production changes. The object of the GHF 
is to provide an endowment fund for the sustainable development of petroleum resources for future generations 
through strategic investment in foreign assets even after the petroleum resources are completely depleted. The 
petroleum revenue collected by the GRA is deposited into the petroleum account at the BoG and 30% of excess 
revenue in each quarter of the year is channeled to the GHF for overseas investment. 
Any critical recommendations will have to be rooted in a meticulous analysis of the economic and 
political conditions in each of the sample countries. Sustainable development or management means that the 
needs of both the present and future generations are met. The petroleum funds (GHF and GSF) are designed to 
ensure intergenerational equity. 
However, the literature explored shows that the institutional weaknesses in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi 
Arabia may deny especially Ghana of sustainable development and management of oil revenue. The apparent 
lack of human capital in Ghana and Nigeria needs to be addressed with a sense of urgency. Until the challenge of 
human capital is tackled across the government institutional machinery, sustainable development and 
management will elude Ghana. This however, takes time and poverty cannot wait. In the short term, Ghana and 
Nigeria can use foreign advice and support policies to address the challenge of sustainable development till the 
required human capital is developed. 
What else can be done to improve petroleum revenue management in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia 
where political competition and institutions are rudimentary? The concept of ‘Good Enough Governance’ by 
Grindle (2004) can be employed. The idea is that Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia should pursue improvements 
in their governance in ways that are feasible and possible to their specific context rather than trying to replicate 
the so called best functioning models from a country like Norway. This involves creative pursuit of incremental 
reforms that do not challenge the deeply rooted or entrenched interests of bureaucrats, politicians and other 
minority groups all at once but rather bring together some key stakeholders and constituencies for change over 
time instead of a grand bargain (a strategy that reconfigures many institutional interactions at once); (Thurber et 
al, 2010). 
How will an incremental reform look like in Ghana, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia? First of all, reforms 
should concentrate on the continued disclosure of realistic information about the oil sector in their respective 
countries, and the capacity and work of civil society groups and other Non-Governmental Organizations focused 
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on transparency and accountability in the petroleum sector must be supported and strengthened (Thurber et al, 
2010). In terms of petroleum revenue management, the efforts of the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) have over the years been disappointing. Notwithstanding, in terms of data or 
information on hydrocarbon activities in Nigeria, there abounds a lot of information for the general public 
through the NEITI. It is however, important that this fundamental data collating function be sustained even in the 
light of turbulent and flagging political support and protest from affected parties. Thurber (2010) and colleagues 
further admit that that the success factors of the Norwegian oil administration rest on their focus on the 
collection and dissemination of information on oil operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf as well as 
clearly defined functional roles of institutions. 
Also, the reforms to be made to current institutions in their respective oil and gas sectors should focus 
on changes that are concrete or realistic and can be sustained as opposed to changes that are indeterminate and 
comprehensive. It is saddening that even the best-conceived institutional blueprints cannot turn Nigeria’s oil and 
gas sector into that of Norway in one fell swoop. However, recognizing the context dependence of oil reform 
will help countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia to undertake reform options that are concrete, realistic 
and that produce measurable and sustainable improvement rather than a ‘dispiriting trail of dashed hopes’. 
The tenets of EITI must be adhered to through government commitment to address issues of corruption, 
favoritism and nepotism. The literature showed that mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability are 
required in Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. The various governments should adopt the policies of ‘Publish 
What You Pay’ and ‘Publish What You Earn’ mechanisms to enhance transparency and control of petroleum 
revenues. This will help create public confidence and trust that petroleum revenues are openly and transparently 
managed, thus breaking the yoke of oil revenue as government secrecy which results in mismanagement and 
embezzlement by politicians (General Sani Abacha and the King of Saudi Arabia) which can lead to conflict. 
With transparency and accountability coupled with participation by the civil society, productive institutions can 
be built and strengthened. 
Even now, Ghana cannot talk about sustainability because the revenue is not even enough to service the 
current generation, let alone leaving some for future generations. It is important to point out that the institutional 
challenges in Ghana are not as a result of the oil wealth because Ghana discovered oil in 2007 and started 
production in the last quarter of 2010. Ghana’s institutional curse is historical. However, since the curse is not 
permanent, the oil wealth presents an opportunity for Ghana to correct the influences of the past and strive 
towards building and strengthening strong and healthy productive institutions. 
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